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In this paper the author investigates the place 
of philosophy in European culture. Philosophy 
has taken a considerable time to be recognised, 
or to recognise itself, as distinct from other 
disciplines. Although philosophy gave birth to 
physics and, more recently, to other sciences, 
it is not seen as a “technical” subject, like 
mathematics and natural sciences, or even 
social sciences such as economics. Philosophy 
is available to the general (educated) public 
while the technical subjects are not. All educated 
people know the names of the great Western 
philosophers. Less people know the names of the 
great mathematicians (other than those such as 
Descartes and Leibniz which were, at the same 
time, philosophers). Therefore, philosophy has 
not lost its place as part of high culture, as have 
the natural sciences and mathematics. Philosophy 
continues to exert a pervasive effect upon 
European culture in general. However, according 
to the author, two tasks lie before philosophers; 
two gulfs are for us to bridge. The fi rst one is 
the gulf between philosophers of all schools 
and scientists (particularly physicists); the other 
one is that between divergent philosophical 
schools – between analytical philosophy and 
so called “continental” philosophy. If it solves 
these problems, philosophy will remain what it 
has been in the past – a shining component of 
European culture.
Keywords: philosophy, high culture, natural sci-
ences, mathematics, analytic philosophy, “conti-
nental” philosophy
1What place does philosophy have in 
European culture? Well, what is meant 
by the word “culture” in this question? 
Th e word is used in a number of diff erent 
senses. One of those currently prevalent 
is that introduced by anthropologists to 
denote the whole complex of modes of life 
within a society – its marriage customs, 
funeral rites, style of dress, of dance and 
of cooking, the way its members interact 
with one another and all the rest.2
Th is is a legitimate and useful concept; but 
it is not, I think, that intended by the word 
in our question. Rather, what is meant is 
what may be called “high culture”: culture 
in the sense of what is possessed by what is 
called “a cultured person”.
What belongs to high culture, and what 
are the criteria for its belonging? First, it 
must demand great skill in its creators. 
1  Lecture given at the opening of the 6th National Con-
ference of the Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy, held 
in Genoa (Italy), September 2004. A version of the lecture 
will also be published in Minazzi F. ed. (2007), Filosofi a, 
scienza e bioetica nel dibattito contemporaneo. Studi inter-
nazionali in onore di Evandro Agazzi, Presidenza del Con-
siglio dei ministri - Di partimento per leditoria, Instituto 
poligrafi co e zecca dello stato, Roma.
2 Th is article was originally printed, unfortunately with 
typos and other mistakes, in this journal, Vol. 3, No. 1, 
2007: 21-30. Th e Editors of EuJAP thank Carlo Penco for 
proof-reading this version.
All the references made to the paper in this issue of the 
journal will include the original reference to the 2007 pa-
per as well as the reference to this republished version.




Secondly, and more importantly, it must give pleasure, but, in doing so, it must elevate 
the soul or the mind. Music, literature and the fi ne arts satisfy both these conditions. 
Note that while what belongs to high culture must elevate the soul or the mind, it 
cannot have the cultivation of the soul as one of its direct objectives, otherwise religion 
would be part of high culture. It is not so considered: a cultured person may be devout, 
but need not be.
In the phrase “popular culture” the word “culture” is not intended in the anthropologists’ 
sense, nor, plainly, in that of “high culture”; so we have yet another sense of the term. 
Popular culture comprises only what is generally appreciated or enjoyed by that great 
bulk of the population, formerly known as “the masses” and nowadays as “ordinary 
people”. Individual members of this body of people in fact, often appreciate components 
of high culture, say painting or classical music: you do not have to be highly educated 
to enjoy such things. Still, as matters now stand among us, this is not the general 
rule. What is called popular culture consists of what corresponds in popular taste to 
ingredients of high culture, as popular music corresponds to classical music. In the case 
of music, the line between high and popular culture is easily drawn. In some other arts, 
notably cinema, it barely exists.
We picked out two criteria for something to be a component of high culture: it must 
demand great skill of its creators; and it must elevate the mind or the soul. Th ere is a 
third criterion, however, which it must satisfy.
We may see this by considering mathematics. It undoubtedly satisfi es the fi rst two 
criteria: it demands great skill, and, quite apart from the essential importance of its 
applications, it has an intellectual beauty that can be found in nothing else. It elevates 
the mind. Almost certainly, we can reckon mathematics as a part of the culture of 
ancient Greece: surely in that society any cultivated person would have know some 
mathematics, have taken pleasure in it and have regarded it as something he could 
expect others to know about. But it has not been like that since, and certainly is not 
like that now. Mathematics cannot be called a part of present-day European culture. 
Its practice demands great skill, and it unquestionably elevates the mind; but unlike, 
say, music, it is a component of the life of very few people indeed, compared with the 
population at large. Football is a component of the life of many people; but it cannot 
claim to elevate either the soul or the mind.
Philosophy has taken a considerable time to be recognised, or to recognise itself, as 
distinct from other disciplines. Aristotle of course had no conception that the Organon, 
the Metaphysics, the De Anima, the Ethics and, perhaps, the Politics were comprised in 
philosophy, and his other works in natural science and literary criticism. All were part 
of knowledge. Even in our day W. V. Quine thought that philosophy was just the most 
general sector of science. Newton’s great work of physics was entitled Mathematical 
Principles of Natural Philosophy, and we still have University Chairs of Natural 
Philosophy (and of Experimental Philosophy) devoted to what we now call natural 
science. In the XIX century psychology was only gradually detached from philosophy, 
a detachment some still regret. In the XX century mathematical logic budded from 
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philosophy, perhaps as a branch of mathematics, perhaps as a separate discipline of its 
own, and has itself given birth to computer science. Linguistics detached itself more 
rapidly. Cognitive science is a later, and arguably illegitimate, child of philosophy.
But I do not believe that philosophy is merely the mother from which nascent sciences 
are born, a matrix of overheated vapour within which new stars are formed and 
begin to shine by their own light; and I think that few people, philosophers or non-
philosophers, believe this either. Philosophy mat give birth to new disciplines which 
we cannot now imagine; but there are forms of philosophical enquiry that will never 
be absorbed by sciences that have become extraneous to it.
Now the example of mathematics was not unique. In classical times it was an ingredient 
of high culture; now it is so no longer. Th e same holds good of the natural sciences. 
Th e further mathematics and the natural sciences have advanced, the less and less have 
they been reckoned as what every cultivated person may be expected to know about. 
Th e natural sciences remain very infl uential, however, not directly through peoples 
knowing about them, but by apparently authoritative pronouncements by scientists 
about their implications.
Has the same happened to philosophy? No. Philosophy is classifi ed in all universities 
with the Humanities or the Arts rather than with the sciences; and that agrees with the 
general conception of its place as part of human wisdom. What ground do we have 
for so classifying it? Philosophy, unlike the sciences, carries its past with it. A student 
of physics, rather than of the history and perhaps the philosophy of physics, does no 
need to read Newton or Maxwell or even Einstein: competent modern accounts of 
their theories suffi  ce for his purpose. Th e work of a scientist lives a residue, which can 
be encapsulated in a modern exposition of it. Th is is not true of the writings of the 
philosophers. Th ey resemble poetry and drama in that the possibility of extracting 
something new from them can never be closed off . A good education in philosophy 
must comprise an education in the history of philosophy, and from the original sources. 
Th e ideas of Kant, for instance, have had many able expositors; but his work cannot 
be said to have left a residue that may be encapsulated in the textbooks, and makes the 
reading of his work redundant.
For this reason, although philosophy gave birth to physics and, more recently, to other 
sciences, it is not seen as a “technical” subject, like mathematics and natural sciences, 
or even the social sciences such as economics. It is available to the general educated 
public as the technical subjects are not, save to those who have been trained in them. 
All educated people know the names of the great Western philosophers, many more 
than the ones that know the names of the great mathematicians (other than those 
such as Descartes and Leibniz who have also been philosophers). Th e writings of 
great philosophers can be readily obtained, in the original and in translation. Anyone 
attracted to the subject, or to some particular philosopher, can without diffi  culty read 
the classics of philosophy. To do so, he does no need to have had a great deal of previous 
training, as he does to read mathematical works; and if he fi nds that he needs help in 
understanding or evaluating what he reads, there are plenty of good introductions to 
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and commentaries of Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Husserl, etc. Philosophy has 
not therefore lost its place as part of high culture, as have the natural sciences and 
mathematics.
By contrast with the sciences, most educated people in Europe have probably read 
some philosophy, even if only Platonic dialogues. In the Middle Ages, the famous 
work of Boethius, De Consolatione Philosophiae, was one of the most widely read 
books. We cannot name any work of philosophy of which the same is true today. It 
remains that in many European countries, a signifi cant number of people keep abreast 
of contemporary trends in philosophy and at least deep into books by philosophers 
of the day. I was impressed when an Italian daily newspaper, Il Sole 24 ore, printed 
articles on philosophy by myself, Professor Vattimo, Angelo Marchesi, Enrico Berti, 
Professors Possenti and Haldane and Dr. Massarenti. Th ough I am ashamed to say 
that this would be unimaginable in Britain, I believe that something similar would 
have been possible in a French or German newspaper, and perhaps in other European 
countries. Philosophy does still satisfy all three criteria for belonging to high culture.
Ideas propounded by philosophers are therefore able to seep down into the general 
consciousness and exert an infl uence on many people’s thinking. Th is is particularly 
evident in political philosophy. It needs no argument that the work of John Locke and 
of John Stuart Mill contributed greatly to liberal ideas and ideals, and that the writing 
of Jean-Jacques Rousseau had a formative infl uence upon the ideals of the Revolution 
of 1789. Nor is any argument required that the work of Fichte and Hegel played a 
major part in the development of Prussian nationalism. Th e most salient example is, 
of course, the work of Karl Marx, which was the dominant infl uence upon socialist 
revolutions of the XX century.
Th e classics of moral philosophy have been far less infl uential in general. Th e ideas of 
some of the greatest moral philosophers, of Aristotle and Kant, say, have exerted very 
little infl uence on the ethical ideas of the non-philosophical public at large. But some 
schools of moral philosophy have been infl uential: Utilitarianism, in particular, has 
infl uenced the moral outlook of a great many people.
Th e dualism of Descartes has probably had a more pervasive infl uence upon the 
thinking of the general run of Europeans than any other philosophical conception of 
human nature, prompting such misbegotten questions as “Do animals have souls?”; 
and, to the detriment of our behaviour toward creatures of other animal species, the 
mechanist Cartesian view of animals has also aff ected, or infected, our outlook upon 
our fellow creatures. Today some philosophers, especially of the analytic school, have 
imbibed the mechanist view of ourselves prevalent among many scientists, leading 
to perplexity about the nature and utility of consciousness; “What is the point of 
there being such a thing as consciousness?” they ask. Such questions are remnant of 
Cartesian dualism, now seen as an obstacle to the desired goal of total materialism. 
Th ese are unhappy eff ects of philosophical ideas, fi ltered down to the thinking of 
so-called “ordinary people”, and of the ideas of philosophically untrained scientists 
which nevertheless impress some philosophers: but they illustrate the muffl  ed interplay 
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between the thoughts of professional philosophers, scientists and those who have never 
read either a philosophical or a scientist article.
Philosophy continues to exert a pervasive eff ect upon European culture in general. 
Philosophy – but not analytic philosophy – has in our time infl uenced both literature 
and literary criticism. Philosophy cannot assume the triumphant posture that the 
natural sciences take up. It has made great progress since it was initiated by the ancient 
Greeks; yet there are few philosophical problems that have defi nitively been solved. You 
may say the same of physics and of cosmology: no one can predict the appearance of 
these subjects in fi fty years’ time. But there are theories which all present-day physicists 
accept, even though they know that there are imperfections in them which will have 
somehow to be resolved, and that the theories now accepted may be replaced by others. 
By contrast, outside logic, there are few theories which all philosophers accept. I do not 
think that this is due to the physicists’ being better at their job than philosophers are at 
theirs; doubtless if the physicists had been made to do philosophy and the philosophers 
to do physics, the result would have been much the same.
What is a genuine cause of regret, is the paucity of dialogue between philosophers and 
physicists. Th e generality of philosophers know too little physics to dare to venture to 
treat of the philosophical problems it raises, or to take due to account of physical theories 
when addressing problems on which they bear; I confess that I myself know far less 
physics than I ought. Here I disagree with the bold claim of the manifesto that analytic 
philosophers are both humanists and scientists: they may respect physics, but they do 
not know it.3* Specialist philosophers of physics speak a technical language among 
themselves, and fail to communicate with other philosophers in the mainstream.
Physicists are aware that their subject raises many conceptual diffi  culties, but do not 
image that either a training in philosophy or a discussion of these diffi  culties with 
philosophers would help in solving them. Th is failure in communication across the gulf 
which separates the humanities [and] the sciences lame the thought of philosophers 
and also of physicists about the nature of physical reality, concerning what physics have 
made such tremendous advances in our knowledge and has raised such tremendous 
problems for our understanding.
Scientists principally value scientifi c theories for the ability accurately to predict the 
results of observation.
Philosophers of science, and particularly of physics, concern themselves with the 
interpretation of those theories, that is with clarifying what, if the theories are true, 
they must be understood as telling us about the nature of reality. Th e nature of reality 
is of course the subject-matter of that branch of philosophy which we call metaphysics: 
the philosophy of physics is a substantial part of metaphysics. Diff erent interpretations 
of one of the same physical theory – quantum mechanics, for example – yield what are 
3 *Th e Author refers to the manifesto of the 6th National Conference of the Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy, 
that is available at: http://www.sifa.unige.it/genoa04/intro.htm.
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in fact diff erent but, for the time being, empirically equivalent physical theories. We 
have, however, no examples of empirically equivalent theories – or that yield the same 
predictions of observable events – that is demonstrably not logically equivalent – capable 
of translating into one another and I doubt if there are any. So the interpretation of 
physical theories is not a matter only for those with philosophical concerns, irrelevant 
to practicing scientists. It can never be held for certain the empirical results will not 
favour one interpretation as against another. Th e philosophy of physics is relevant to 
physics, which should lament the loss of that title by which it was known by Newton, 
“natural philosophy”.
I should not like my remarks about physics to be heard as a retractation of my earlier 
disparagement of scientistic attitudes on the part of some philosophers, who take 
materialism as axiomatic although it is doubtful whether they could clearly explain 
what matter is. Because of the manifest great successes of the natural sciences, many 
scientists have adopted an arrogant attitude to the eff ect that all we know we know by 
science; even if history is counted as a science, it is not from science that we know that 
genocide is wicked, or that Michelangelo was a great artist. Th is attitude on the part 
of scientists has shamefully intimidated some philosophers, who hope by humbling 
themselves before the scientists they will be entitled to share in their triumphalism. 
None of this is to the credit of either scientists or philosophers.
It may be argued what I have said about physics applies equally to other sciences, 
neurophysiology for instance, which concern human nature more than the nature of 
physical reality. Th at may be so: the problem is certainly not specifi c to physics, though 
I personally think that the philosophical conundrums raised by physics are deeper as 
well as more diffi  cult than those raised by other sciences.
However this may be, we face diffi  culties that philosophers of past generations did not. 
Never before, I believe, have philosophy and the natural sciences been so far apart. But 
I see no reason why we or our successors will be unable to tackle these diffi  culties. Th e 
European tradition of philosophy survived having an inadequate logic (though not one 
comparable to alchemy): it surmounted that obstacle by creating a more adequate one. 
Doubtless the European tradition of philosophy will overcome its inadequate grasp of 
scientifi c theory.
Th e divorce between the studies of philosophers and of physicists, once regarded as 
parts of the same subject, is as much to be deplored as a more discussed failure of 
communication – that between philosophers of the analytic school and those inaptly 
labelled “continental”. Never before, since that gulf opened, in about 1920, has there 
been so severe a diffi  culty of communication between European philosophers of 
diff erent schools. Th e diffi  culties have perhaps lessened somewhat since, say, 1960; 
certainly the will, on both sides, to overcome it has greatly strengthened.
In my opinion analytical philosophy owes its origins more to the work of philosophers 
on the continent of Europe than to that of the British philosophers G.E. Moore and 
Bertrand Russell, who are sometimes credited with being its founders. Th e remote 
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ancestor of analytical philosophy was the great Czech mathematician and philosopher 
Bernard Bolzano, who in mathematics anticipated the work of Weierstrass and in 
philosophy that of Gottlob Frege, who was born in the year that Bolzano died and was 
the true father of analytical philosophy. He, rather than Russell or even Peano, was the 
inventor of modern logic. Even if there are some contemporary analytical philosophers 
who now wish to repudiate it, without question it was the linguistic turn that launched 
analytical philosophy. And the linguistic turn was fi rst taken in Frege’s Die Grundlagen 
der Arithmetik of 1884, in which the epistemological and metaphysical question “How 
are numbers given to us?” is answered by an exploration of the senses of sentences 
containing terms for numbers.
Some have, unfairly to Frege, attributed the linguistic turn to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. 
Frege had seen natural language as infected by maladies – ambiguity being the most 
obvious – that made it unsuitable for scientifi c use because they rendered deductive 
inference unreliable. He therefore not only aspired after but constructed a symbolic 
language devoid of these defects, and used it to carry out his construction of number 
theory and of analysis. Before he had completed the task, he learned that his beautiful 
purifi ed language was inconsistent. Th is naturally made him more wary of language 
than ever. He never retreated from his view that we human beings can grasp thoughts 
only as expressed in language – verbal or symbolic language; but he thought of all 
language as liable to mislead us into taking form for substance.
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein took a diff erent view. We did no need to construct a 
purifi ed language: a perfect order already underlay the sentences of natural language, an 
order which he had faith would be revealed by a complete analysis of those sentences. 
In his later philosophy he repudiated that faith, and, with it, the desire for perfect 
order. It remained that we had no need to purify natural language by constructing 
an ideal language, but not now because there was a perfect order underlying it, but 
because the ideal of perfect order was itself illusory. Natural language is a disordered 
jumble, which can be described only piecemeal; but for creatures that engage in such 
multifarious activities, a disordered jumble is precisely what we need.
Th is altered attitude is a natural consequence of turning from the philosophy of 
mathematics that had been Frege’s central concern to more general philosophical 
problems. It is not at all that mathematics is unconcerned with concepts expressed 
in the language of everyday speech. “Cardinal equivalence” and “ordinal number” 
are terms seldom met with in everyday speech; but “just as many” and “the fourth 
one” are quite common. Th ere are many important such mathematical concepts: 
cardinal number, ordinal number, measurement-number (real number), rate of 
change, continuity, fi nitude, dimension. But the mathematician is not interested in 
characterising the ordinary speaker’s notions of such concepts. He wishes, rather, to 
replace the hazy everyday concepts by precisely defi ned ones, concepts so defi ned as to 
be applicable in most general case. Th e philosopher of mathematics, like Frege, handles 
mathematical concepts as the mathematician does, or tries to do better at this than the 
mathematicians have done.
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When philosophers refl ect on non-mathematical concepts that are not the special 
property of particular sciences such as chemistry, they are bound to try to unravel 
the grasp of them manifested in everyday speech. Th is is because many philosophical 
perplexities stem from confusions generated by the everyday concepts. Th e mathema-
tician’s response is to defi ne the concepts more precisely, even if not faithfully to our 
ordinary grasp of them, and then prove some theorems about them. Th is approach is 
sometimes fruitfully copied by philosophers, but it often appears superfi cial, even for 
mathematical concepts; both Brower and Weyl felt that the notion of continuity in 
classical mathematics did not do justice to our understanding of temporal continuity. 
Th e diff erence of approach is of course due to the simple fact that it is not the object 
of mathematics to resolve philosophical puzzles.
Th ere is no sharp distinction between scientifi c concepts and everyday ones. Philosophers 
of the present day discuss everyday concepts such as “material substance” and “natural 
kinds” taking for granted scientifi c facts and ideas known to everyone, such as the 
molecular composition of matter, the theory of evolution by natural selection and the 
concept of “a species”. But the scientifi c understanding of more general concepts yet, 
such as “time”, “space”, “cause” and “matter itself ”, which are salient components of 
everyday thought, is not general currency; it was for this reason that I earlier laid such 
stress on the need for philosophers to understand physics.
Th e diff erence of approach between mathematicians and philosophers explains why 
philosophers such as Wittgenstein turned away from the ideal of system. But the 
heterogeneity of linguistic expressions and of the uses of language is no more a bar to 
a systematic account of language than the heterogeneity of chemical compounds, of 
their behaviour and interactions was a bar to a systematic account and explanation of 
them. Donald Davidson was the great proponent of the study of language through a 
systematic theory of meaning. Th is was perhaps remotely inspired by the tentative and 
unsatisfactory explanation of meaning advanced by the Vienna Circle, surely a salient 
movement within analytical philosophy. Th e concept of meaning is the bridge between 
the philosophy of language and the philosophy of thought; it is obviously because 
words have meanings that thoughts can be expressed in language and that the theory 
of meaning is a path – perhaps the most direct path – to an analysis of the contents 
of our thoughts. Likewise the concept of truth is the bridge between the philosophy 
of language and metaphysics, because metaphysics is that branch of philosophy that 
aims at giving a coherent picture of the reality we inhabit. As the opening sentence 
of the Tractatus asserts, reality is composed, not of objects, but of facts. Facts are true 
propositions; what facts there are is a matter of what propositions are true. So, to arrive 
at a view of what propositions, in general, are true, we must understand the concept 
of truth, just as, to arrive at a view of what propositions are, and what propositions we 
can grasp, we must understand the concept of meaning. Th e concepts of meaning and 
of truth are inextricably linked: they can only be explained together. Th eir explanation 
will be comprised in a theory of meaning. Th at is why I continue to believe that the 
philosophy of language is the foundation-stone of all philosophy.
Two tasks lie before us, two gulfs are for us to bridge. One is that between philosophers, 
Michael Dummett | Th e place of philosophy in european culture
22
of all schools, and scientists (particularly physicists); the other that between divergent 
philosophical schools - between analytical philosophy and that amorphous style perhaps 
by contrast with analytical philosophy it should be called “synthetic” philosophy 
misleadingly labelled “continental”. Noting that in 1900 Frege, the father of analytical 
philosophy, and Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, were rather close in their 
general views. I argued in the past that the way to bridge the second gulf is to go back 
to the time when it fi rst opened up and analyse how it came to open up. So far as I 
have noticed, no one has attempted to do this. I think now that something much 
simpler will do the job. Th e gulf opened for sociological reasons. Before the First World 
War, Russell and Moore had both continued the long-established practice among 
British philosophers of reading philosophy written in German. Th e practice hardly 
survived the War; for this reason, the gulf between English-speaking philosophers – 
though not, of course, analytical philosophers in general – and those on the continent 
began to open long before Hitler came to power. In 1929, Gilbert Ryle, formerly the 
interpreter to British audiences of Brentano, Husserl, Meinong and even Heidegger, 
otherwise unknown to them, was converted by an encounter with Wittgenstein, an 
Austrian who spent most of philosophical career in Cambridge, to a diff erent style of 
philosophy. It would be a complete mistake to attribute analytic philosophy in Britain 
to Americans, as the manifesto appears to suggest. Th e Oxford school of “ordinary 
language” philosophy, dominant from 1945 on, owed nothing to philosophers in the 
United States, of whom its practitioners were largely ignorant. Only after that school 
collapsed did Oxford come under the infl uence of American philosophers. From 1933 
onwards, as emphasised in the manifesto, Nazi persecution compelled many Austrian 
and German philosophers to take refuge in the United States. By the end of the 
Second World War, intercourse between English-speaking philosophers, since the War 
predominantly of the analytic school, and those who spoke German, Polish, Italian 
or French was fi nally silenced. Even now it has not been restored, as you will all be 
dispiritedly aware. Analytic philosophy has attracted professional philosophers in Italy, 
France and Germany; as the existence of this society demonstrates for the most part, 
they practise it without seeking to communicate with their colleagues who continue 
to work in the so-called “continental” vein. But, unless they write in English, they do 
not communicate with the bulk of analytical philosophers, either, because these are 
American and therefore will not and cannot read anything not written in English. Th e 
intellectual gulf has become a linguistic one.
I do not in the least believe that the solution is for all analytical philosophers to write 
exclusively in English, while “continental” ones write in Italian, French or German: 
that would merely make the gulf between two schools forever impassable. Rather, the 
gulf must fi rst be bridged in Europe. Th at is a task best undertaken by European 
philosophers familiar with both traditions. Th e problem is one of communication. 
What is needed is for every philosopher of either school who cares about bridging the 
gulf to take care to write in a manner that can be understood by members of the other 
school. To write philosophy in such a manner is to write so that members of the school 
to which the author does not belong will recognise the work as a telling contribution 
to the philosophical problem with which it deals, one that needs either to be accepted 
or to be answered.
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But how are they to do that? How should I, for example, know how to write so as to 
be understood and make an impact on “continental” philosophers? Or how should 
Professor Vattimo, for example, know how to write to be understood and make an 
impact on analytical philosophers? So far as I can see, the only way to achieve that 
would be for each of us to write an article and then for the other (or someone else of 
the same philosophical school) to write a critique of it, explaining why it seemed to 
him opaque, unconvincing or irrelevant. Th e European Journal of Philosophy has had 
a commendably catholic editorial policy, but it does not serve the purpose I have in 
mind. I should like to see a journal devoted to just the purpose I have indicated: articles 
by those who acknowledge themselves to be analytical or “continental” philosophers, 
published simultaneously with critiques by members of the other school. In a fairly 
short time this should lead to an ability on the part of members of both schools to 
communicate eff ectively with the other, if they had the will to do so. Th e gulf would 
have been bridged.
Without question the European tradition of philosophy has been a great one. It has 
explored the great problems of philosophy with depth and insight. It faces problems 
at the present time, those I have described and possibly other ones. It ought to strive 
to solve these problems, and will solve them if the will to do so exists, which it surely 
does. If it solves them, it will remain what it has been in the past, a shining component 
of European culture.
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